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DENNIS D. LINNELL, Argument Priority 15 
Respondent/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996). 
However, the issues have been mooted by Appellant's acceptance of the benefits of the Trial 
Court's decision and execution of a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the addendum to Appellant's brief. In 
addition, §§ 30-3-5(7)(a) and 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iii) are set forth in the addendum to this Brief 
of Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This is a suit for divorce brought by the Appellee ("Carolyn") seeking termination of 
the marriage, alimony, child support and an equitable division of the marital estate. The case 
was tried before District Court Judge David S. Young on December 17, 18 and 21, 1998. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered on May 20, 
1999. Appellant ("Dennis") filed objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree before 
entry and filed a Motion to Amend following entry, both of which, after briefing and oral 
argument, were denied. This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's decisions, Dennis 
emphasizes the evidence most favorable to his position and largely ignores the contrary 
evidence. Even when he states the evidence in support of the Findings of Fact, he attacks its 
weight and credibility. 
If Appellant fails to marshal evidence the Appellate Court assumes the record 
supports the findings and proceeds to review the accuracy of the trial courts 
conclusions of law and application of that law. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See also Shephard v. 
Shephard, 876 P.2d 429,432 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38^ 15, 979 
P.2d338. 
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The evidence showed that at the time of trial Carolyn was 46. Dennis was 47. They 
were married in 1972. They have seven children, five of whom were minors at time of trial 
ranging from age 17 to age 5; and six of whom were residing with Carolyn. (R. 125.) 
1. Earnings and Earning Capacity. 
Dennis began working for Lawn Life Company in 1981. He was promoted to 
manager in 1984 and served as such until 1995. He later worked briefly as a consultant for 
lawn care companies and in 1997 formed his own lawn care company known as Green Pointe 
Lawn Care, Inc., with $50,000 provided by Carolyn's father. Dennis' historical earnings 
were shown by Plaintiffs Exhibit 5: 
1993 $169,277 
1994 $155,505 
1995 $ 49,604 
1996 $ 37,377 
In 1997 Green Pointe reported a tax loss of $1,698 although no salaries were paid to 
Dennis or his "partner." In 1998 Green Pointe paid salaries of $14,000 to each of the owners 
and reported a tax loss of $1,000. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6.) The balance sheet of Green Pointe 
showed that at the end of 1998 it had undistributed cash of $38,246 after payment of the 
salaries. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.) 
University of Utah Professor Peter Phillips, a specialist in labor economics, testified 
that in his opinion Dennis could earn between $55,156 and $58,126 per year based on the 
hours he was actually working at Lawn Life and Green Pointe and approximately $41,000 
per year based on a normal 40 hour work week. (R. 241, p. 129, lines 23-25). 
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Dennis rebutted this testimony with that of Dr. Christy Farnsworth, who testified that 
Dennis's earning capacity was between $24,800 and $30,300 per year. (R. 242, p. 340, lines 
15-20.) 
Dennis argued that his earnings level should be set at what he actually drew from his 
company in 1998 ($14,000) even though he chose to start up a business of his own rather 
than work for others at a greater income, at the same time insisting that Carolyn have no 
interest in that business. "I do not want her to be a participant in my business. No sir, we 
can't get along." (R. 242, p. 266, lines 16-17.) 
The Court found that Dennis was voluntarily underemployed and that his earnings for 
alimony and child support purposes should be set at $40,000 per year or $3,333 per month. 
(R. 127-28 (Finding of Fact no. 13).) 
Carolyn has not worked outside the home since 1985. (R. 241, p. 21, lines 13-14.) 
Instead, she has devoted herself to rearing the seven children. (R. 128.) 
At the time of the trial she was enrolled as a full-time student at Salt Lake Community 
College preparatory to the study of Pharmacy at the University of Utah. Her only income 
consisted of rental income from the master bedroom in the family home. (R. 128.) Although 
Carolyn has a hyperthyroid condition, the court found she was employable and imputed 
annual income to her of $11,100 at minimum wage in addition to her rental income. (R. 128 
(Finding of Fact no. 17).) 
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2. Marital Estate. 
The principal assets of the parties were their one-half interest in Green Pointe and 
their residence acquired in 1987 with financial assistance from Carolyn's father. (R. 241, 
p. 30, lines 13-25.) The $380,000 value of the marital residence was undisputed. (R. 241, 
pp. 209-10, lines 19-25,1-11.) At the time of trial there was a mortgage balance of $41,853, 
with a monthly payment of $625. (Defendant's Exhibit 9.) 
The Court ordered Carolyn to refinance the house and pay $100,000 to Dennis as a 
condition to its award to Carolyn. This has been done. Dennis has accepted the money and 
executed a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment. (Satisfaction of Judgment filed December 2, 
1999, not yet indexed but part of the record on appeal.) (Addendum A.) 
The value of Green Pointe was in dispute. Its financial history was short, but 
dramatic. Founded only in 1997, by the end of the lawn care season in 1998 it had paid the 
owners salaries of $28,000, had undistributed earnings of $16,000 (R. 241, p. 148, lines 9-
25), and had cash available for distribution of $38,246 (R. 127). Dennis expected 1999 
earnings to increase $25,000 to $30,000. (R. 242, p. 260, lines 2-7.) 
Gross revenue in 1997 was $45,000. In 1998 it was $119,156. Dennis expected the 
gross to increase by $60,000 to $70,000 in 1999 (R. 242, p. 260, lines 15-22), and to reach 
$185,000. (R. 242, p. 262, lines 1-7.) 
Green Pointe had 700 customers in 1998 and expected to have 1,000 at the end of 
1999. "That's our current goal," said Dennis. (R. 242, p. 255, lines 1-4.) He expected the 
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value of the business and his share of the profits to increase from year to year. (R. 242, 
p. 265, lines 19-25.) 
One of the common value indices in the lawn care business is $200 per customer. 
(R. 242, pp. 249, 267, 268.) This would produce a value for Green Pointe of $140,000 in 
1998 and $200,000 in 1999. 
On the value of Green Pointe, Carolyn proffered the testimony of Deane Smith, a 
certified public accountant and expert in evaluation of small closely held businesses. He 
testified that the value of the company was $71,600. (R. 241, p. 157, lines 3-13.) Dennis' 
expert, Hal Rosen, accountant for the company, said it was worth $35,800. (R. 242, pp. 317-
18, lines 24-25, 1-2.) The Court awarded the parties' one-half interest in the business to 
Dennis at a value of "not less than $35,800." (R. 133-34 (Finding of Fact no. 40).) 
The other property division issue raised by Dennis concerns $60,000 in savings which 
the parties split in 1994 when Carolyn was contemplating a divorce. (R. 241, p. 27, lines 8-
24.) Feeling "insecure with the marriage," she took $40,000 from their savings to support 
her and the children. Dennis took the remaining $20,000. Although they reconciled at that 
time, they separated their finances. Thereafter, Dennis paid only the housing costs. Carolyn 
paid for groceries, clothing and incidentals from money provided by her father. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal is moot, in whole or in part. Dennis accepted the $100,000 from the 
refinancing of the house and the $10,000 from Carolyn's savings, and the parties signed a 
Satisfaction of Judgment. Even if this Court were to reverse the trial court on the property 
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division issues, the parties' actions have irreversibly altered their financial position and the 
status quo at the time of trial cannot be restored. 
However, if this Court determines this appeal remains viable, the decision of the Trial 
Court on the issues of alimony, child support and property division are supported by the 
evidence and the Findings of Fact are within the wide discretion of trial judges in domestic 
relations cases. 
Dennis is capable of earning at least $40,000 per year and voluntarily chose to earn 
less in order to build a successful new business. At the same time, he refuses to permit 
Carolyn to share in the success of the business he is building. 
The Trial Court's award of alimony was reasonable and was made after consideration 
of Carolyn's need, her ability to meet that need, Dennis' ability to pay, and the length of the 
marriage—26 years. 
The division of the marital estate, including the award of the residence to Carolyn, 
was fair and equitable under the circumstances shown by the evidence. 
Property and alimony awards will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,1067 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL IS MOOT. 
After trial and after filing his Notice of Appeal, Dennis received $100,000 from the 
refinancing of the marital residence awarded to Carolyn, and $10,000 from the split in 1994 
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as ordered by the Court. On November 22,1999, his attorneys signed a mutual Satisfaction 
of Judgment reading: 
All things ordered by the court in the Decree of Divorce have been satisfied by both 
parties and hereby direct [sic] the Clerk of the above-entitled Court to satisfy and 
release the record of said Judgment, including attorney's fees, interest and the whole 
thereof. (Satisfaction of Judgment filed December 2, 1999, not yet indexed but part 
of the record on appeal.) (Addendum A.) 
In addition, Dennis on June 25, 1999 quit-claimed his interest in the residence to 
Carolyn to enable her to refinance it. (Addendum A.) Under Black v. Alpha Financial 
Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1982), his interest in the property has been extinguished. 
If a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the 
controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is waived. 
Jacobson Const, v. St. Joseph High Sch., 794 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 156 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973)). 
Although it may be argued that the alimony issue is a "separate and distinct part of the 
controversy" from the property division, it really is not. In divorce cases, the issues of 
alimony, child support, and property division generally are inextricably entwined. They were 
particularly so in this case where, as the Trial Court noted, the cash received by Dennis and 
his exoneration from liability on the mortgage increased his "ability to provide support," and 
when the increased mortgage on her residence and the loss of interest on her "savings" 
increased the "need" of Carolyn. (R. 243, pp. 448-51.) 
See Robertson v. Gem Ins.. Co., 828 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), where, as here, 
the claims were found to be so "interwoven" that they could not intelligently be separated. 
Id. at 507. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARDS OF ALIMONY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ARE WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETION. 
A. Dennis Is Capable of Earning at Least $40,000 per Year, as the 
Trial Court Found. 
Dennis is a hard worker and has demonstrated the ability to earn well in excess of 
$40,000 per year. As manager of Lawn Life, he grew the company from sales of half a 
million with 15 employees and 10 trucks in 1984 to 40 employees, 22 trucks and sales of $2 
million in the mid '90s. (R. 241, p. 187, lines 11-22.) His annual salary was $169,277 in 
1993 and $155,505 in 1994. 
When he chose not to accept a lower level position with Lawn Life and instead to 
become a consultant, he earned $37,377 even though consulting is not a full-time occupation 
unless one has an established reputation as a consultant and a steady clientele. In his first 
year of self-employment at Green Pointe, Dennis paid himself no salary. In 1998 he paid 
himself $14,277 but could have received $33,350 or $2,779 per month. (R. 127.) 
Professor Peter Phillips testified that Dennis could earn between $50,000 and $58,000 
per year depending upon the number of hours worked. Dennis has always worked long 
hours. Dennis' expert, Dr. Farnsworth, acknowledged that Dennis could earn between 
$24,800 and $30,300. The median between the professor's low of $55,156 and Dr. Farns-
worth's high of $30,300 is $42,728, $2,728 more than the $40,000 found by the Trial Court 
to be Dennis' earning capability. 
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Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the court to infer that either Dennis' 
income from his business would increase or that he would seek other employment with an 
adequate remuneration. See Westenskowv. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Utah 1977). 
Dennis' earning capacity was a question of fact and the Trial Court's finding of 
$40,000 per year is well supported by the evidence. 
B. Dennis Chose to Start His Own Company Rather than Work for 
Others at the Income Level He Was Capable of Earning. 
Dennis dwells on his contention that he was involuntarily terminated by Lawn Life. 
However, Brent Schomberg, one of the owners of Lawn Life, testified that there was dispute 
between Ladd Christensen, the principle owner, and Dennis over the amount Dennis, as 
manager, was paying himself. A decision was made by the owners to reduce Dennis' respon-
sibilities and salary, but Dennis declined to accept the demotion and his termination resulted. 
(R. 241, pp. 194-96.) 
It can be debated whether he was terminated by the Company or whether he left of his 
own choice. But even if "canned," as he said he was, his voluntary underemployment did 
not occur then. It occurred when he decided to start up his own company from scratch rather 
than seek employment commensurate with his experience and demonstrated ability. 
The real question then is whether, to start his own business, Dennis voluntarily 
accepted an earnings level below his earning capability. The evidence is undisputed that he 
did so and his reasons are clear. 
In his mind he had been fired by Lawn Life. He had tried private consulting in the 
lawn care business but had lost his most important client. (R. 242, p. 226, lines 18-25.) He 
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did not wish to have his future in the hands of others. He testified, "I have been canned twice 
within a two year period and it was an uncomfortable feeling." (R. 242, p. 263, lines 8-9.) 
He chose to form his own company knowing that there would be an earnings shortfall until 
the company got on its feet. 
He should not be criticized for doing this. Long range it may well be a wise decision, 
but the fact remains that while the company is getting underway—while he is building a 
business for himself—he is leaving the support of his wife and family to Carolyn and her 
father and, at the same time, denying Carolyn an interest in that business. 
The Trial Court correctly concluded that Dennis was voluntarily underemployed. 
(R. 127-28 (Finding of Fact no. 13).) At the very least this was a question of fact, supported 
by the evidence and well within the discretion of the Trial Court. Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 
965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The Amount of Alimony Awarded by the Trial Court Is 
Reasonable. 
Deane Smith, CPA, employed by Carolyn for the financial aspects of her case, 
testified that her pre-tax need was $2,821 per month. (R. 241, pp. 151-52, lines 8-25, 1-3.) 
Carolyn offered an exhibit which she had prepared for the Commissioner in response to a 
request that she pare her "need" to the absolute minimum. It showed $2,690. (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 4.) 
The Trial Court noted that her estimate of expenses for gas, food, clothing and miscel-
laneous were too low (R. 243, pp. 411-12, lines 22-24,1-4.) but, after deleting certain items, 
found her need to be $2,486 per month. (R. 135.) 
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Carolyn's actual ability to meet her need was only $325 per month which she received 
as rent for the master bedroom in her home. She simply did not have the ability to be a full-
time student and the primary caretaker of five minor children and to be gainfully employed 
outside the home. However, the Trial Court imputed $11,100 per year to her (R. 128), with 
the following result: 
Carolyn's need $2,486 
Carolyn's actual income - 325 
Carolyn's imputed income - 925 
Shortfall $1,036 
Child support $1,069 
Based on this arithmetic Dennis argues that no need for alimony was shown. 
However, this ignores the discussion between Court and counsel at the second of the 
final arguments on December 21, 1998 where the Court considered the effect of ordering 
Carolyn to refinance the home and to pay Dennis $120,000 in cash on Carolyn's need and 
Dennis' ability to pay. At eight percent finance rates, Carolyn's need increased by $800 per 
month. (R. 243, pp. 448-51.) 
Dennis' imputed income was $3,333 a month. His need as found by the Court was 
$949 per month. (R. 135-36.) His ability to meet her unmet need, therefore, was $2,384 per 
month before consideration of the earning power of his $120,000 cash award. Child support 
was determined under the guidelines to be $1,069 per month. (R. 136.) 
Considering the Jones factors, including the length of the marriage, the Trial Court 
set alimony at $1,100 per month, pretty much dividing Dennis's 1998 income three ways. 
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In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct App. 1989) the husband claimed his 
financial obligations were nearly equal to his income, leaving him insufficient funds which 
to support himself. This Court said: 
In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of the 
following three factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving the 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him 
or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding party to provide support. If these three 
factors have been considered, we will not disturb the Trial Court's alimony award 
unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the party receiving alimony will be 
able to support him or herself "as nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . 
enjoyed during the marriage." 
Id. at 90 (internal citations omitted). 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) relied upon by Dennis, the Supreme 
Court restated the three factors articulated in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 
1977), and, in reversing the decision of the Trial Court, noted that, unlike this case, nowhere 
in the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, its Findings of Fact, or its Statements made on 
the record at the conclusion of the hearing is there any indication the Court analyzed the 
circumstances of the parties in light of these three factors. 
In Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court found that Mrs. Rehn 
had a need for support, concluded that $3,300 was not an unreasonable monthly expense for 
a mother and two children, and observed the that the Trial Court properly considered the 
length of the parties' marriage in awarding alimony when it indicated that "this is a twenty-
year marriage where alimony is appropriate." A similar observation of this 26 year marriage 
was made by the Trial Judge in this case. (R. 243, p. 453, line 2.) 
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In Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Court ordered the husband to pay 
$1,600 per month in alimony and $2,200 per month in total family maintenance for the wife 
and three minor children despite the husband's total lack of current income. The Court found 
"no abuse of discretion" noting that the trial court considered the husband's historic earnings, 
the needs of the family, and the inability of the wife to support herself and perform her 
parental duties for the children, although the only finding on the need of the wife was 
"plaintiff is in need of alimony." 
Turning to the record due to the absence of findings, the Court in Olsen said that the 
undisputed facts there, taken with the plaintiffs evidence on disputed facts, established that 
the plaintiffs only substantial asset was her share of the equity in the marital home and that 
to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage, the living expenses of 
the wife and the three children would be almost twice the amount awarded for family 
maintenance. That would appear to be true in this case as well, and Carolyn and the children 
may have to continue to rely to some extent on the generosity of Carolyn's father. 
Other circumstances to be considered were the fact that Carolyn was engaged in career 
or occupational training although perhaps not to establish basic job skills as provided in § 78-
45-7.5 (7)(d)(iii), and the fact that the husband's earnings were definitely on an upward trend. 
Section 30-3-5 (7)(a) requires the Trial Court in determining alimony to consider the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient's earning capacity, the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support, the length of the marriage, and whether the recipient spouse has 
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custody of minor children. The Trial Court discussed, considered and made findings on each 
of these factors. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS WITHIN THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
A. The Award of the Marital Residence to Carolyn Was Reason-
able. 
There were many reasons why the Court felt that the marital residence should be 
awarded to Carolyn rather than sold as urged by Dennis. Among them were the difficulty of 
finding a suitable residence for a family of that size, the uniqueness of the residence as 
testified to by Dennis (R. 241, pp. 205-211.), the network of neighbors, and the desirability 
of avoiding disruption of the children. Carolyn testified: 
I think . . . it would be extremely disruptive. Not only to the children, but also to 
myself. I've gone to school. I go full time. I'm gone a great deal of the time. I have 
young—my four little girls are young, and they are there a lot by themselves. I have 
a neighbor who lives behind me. Our yards are joined with an open fence, and my 
children are very comfortable going over and asking for help with their family. She 
can also see what is going on in my family, in my home. In fact, she has come over 
a number of times and checked on my children. 
I also need help with lessons or sports events or church activities where I am not 
there, and children on the same street, they are my children's ages, they are involved 
in these activities. So car pooling is accessible and easy. 
I think it is also really difficult for too many changes have happened in my children's 
lives that I think it would be extremely emotionally upsetting to them to move into a 
different home, have different bedrooms, have things that are not familiar that give 
them the security that they could use at this time. (R. 241, p. 35-36, lines 23-25, 1-
21.) 
Rather than order the house sold, the Trial Court asked Carolyn to see if it would be 
possible for her to pay Dennis $100,000 and exonerate him from liability on the mortgage, 
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which would enable him to finance a suitable residence for himself and improve the quality 
of his visitation rights with the children of which he was complaining. After Carolyn 
reported such refinancing was possible, the Court so ordered. (R. 243, p. 458, lines 1-24.) 
This was a wise decision, one clearly within the discretion of the Trial Court. 
B. The Property Division Was Equitable. 
Carolyn was awarded property valued at about $385,000. (R. 124-38.) Dennis was 
awarded property valued at $105,000. (R. 124-38.) The $100,000 Carolyn was ordered to 
pay Dennis reduced the disparity to $285,000 versus $205,000. This disparity was more than 
amply justified by the fact that the property awarded to Dennis (Green Pointe and cash) was 
income producing, was increasing in value, and was likely to increase in value in the future. 
The property awarded to Carolyn was neither. Marital property may be allocated unequally 
where the circumstances justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution. 
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239 \ 19, 987 P.2d 603. 
In addition, the "unequality" was more apparent than real. It resulted from valuation 
of Green Pointe at 60% of 1998 revenue of $119,000 or $71,600 and awarding the parties' 
one-half interest to Dennis. (R. 142-43.) In its Findings, the Court did not value that one-
half interest at $35,800; but rather the Court found the value was "not less than $35,800." 
(R. 143, emphasis added.) In fact it is worth more than that amount. 
In its first year of operations Green Pointe had a loss without paying any salaries to 
its owner-employees. In its second year of operation it paid salaries of $14,000 to each of 
the owners and had only a very small loss. Dennis testified that he expected the customer 
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base to increase from 700 to 1,000 in the third year of operations (1999). Applying the index 
Dennis testified was common in the industry of $200 per account, Green Pointe was worth 
$140,000 in 1998 and would be worth $200,000 at the end of 1999 if the expected growth 
occurs. 
Applying the other common yardstick of value in such companies (60% of the gross 
revenue, of $185,000 as predicted by Dennis), the year-end 1999 value would have been 
$111,000. 
Although the Trial Court was reluctant to place value on the company based on future 
earnings, that is exactly what millions of people in the United States are doing today in 
valuing common stocks. The brokers talk about the difference between trailing earnings, that 
is, the ones that have actually been reported, and forward earnings, looking one or more years 
ahead. 
By the two measures of value employed in this case, Green Pointe was not only worth 
"not less than" $35,800, but enough more to remove any apparent disparity in the property 
division. 
Dennis' argument made with respect to the division of the savings account in 1994 
is that when those savings were split they continued to be marital property and should have 
been so treated at the time of trial. The evidence was otherwise. The parties kept these funds 
separate. They opened separate bank accounts. Carolyn did not commingle those funds with 
any other funds. In effect, they split up the family finances and each contributed to the 
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support of the family from their separate monies. Carolyn's contributions came primarily 
from gifts from her father. (R. 241, pp. 22-23, lines 17-25, 1-21.) 
There is no fixed formula in divorce proceedings upon which to determine division 
of properties. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993). It is a prerogative of the 
Court to make whatever division of property it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. In the division of marital property, the Trial Judge has 
wide discretion and his findings will not be disturbed unless the record indicates an abuse 
thereof. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
The division of the marital property was fair and equitable and well within the 
discretion of the Trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Trial Court is based on the evidence, reflected in the Findings, and 
supported by established statutory and case law and should be affirmed. 
DATED this / 5 (lay of March, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
C \WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRlE~l\STATMNTS WPD 3/13/00 
Harold G. Christensen 
Rodney R. Parker 
Heather S. White 
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Appellee 
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foregoing Brief of Appellee to be served by first class mail upon the following: 
DAVID S STEFFENSEN PC 
RICHARD L KING PC 
2159 S 700 ESTE 100 
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ADDENDUM 
The following addendum is submitted pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(a)(l 1). 
A. Satisfaction of Judgment and Deed 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iii) 
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ADDENDUM A 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (A0638) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DENNIS D. LINNELL, 
Respondent, 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
No. 974903252 
Judge David S. Young 
All things ordered by the Court in the Decree of Divorce have 
been satisfied by both parties and hereby direct the Clerk of the 
above-entitled Court to satisfy and release the record of said 
Judgment, including attorney's fees, interest and the whole 
thereof. 
DATED this 'l day of November, 1999 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
fcOLD G. CHRISTENSETT 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
HEATHER S. WHITE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this yy** day of November, / ^ , 
1999. 
Notaryvlpublic 
Residing in the S ta t e of Utah 
My Commission Expires 
J-/7-0P 
Margo 0. Coltgrov* 
10 Exchanpt PL • PO Box 46000! 
Silt Ukt City. UT 041464000 
If y Commission Exptass 
ftbru*ry17,800* 
STATE OF UTAH 
DATED this Icul day of November, 1999. 
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN 
By 
David W. StefyEensen 
Attorneys f ens' Respondent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
November, 1999 
.Tc 2/ Notai^ y Publ: 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires 
N:\19497\1\JUDGMNT.SAT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Alison H. Hansen, says that she is employed by the law 
offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Petitioner Carolyn Hammond Linnell; that she served the attached 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT (Case Number 974903252, Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah) upon the party 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
David W. Steffensen 
Steffensen McDonald Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the IT* 
day of November, 1999. 
Alison H. Hansen 
N:\19497\1\MAILCRT.18 
rr WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO: 
Harold (J. Clitistetiben 
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place. I lth Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 841-15 
7 3 9 2 1 . 4 * 
04/21/99 1*51 PH t o . O f 
NANCY UORKJ1AN 
RECORDER* SALT LAKE COUNTY» UTAH 
SN0U CHRISTEN3EN 4 ilARTINEAU 
P0 BOX iSOOG 
REC 8--':R FRtSGUES fDEPijr? - yr 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
Dennis D. Liiuiell. grantor, of 3830 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereby quitclaims 
to Carolyn Hammond LinuelL grantee, of 2988 Kempner Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the sum 
of Ten Dollars and no/100 ($10.00), the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, to wit: 
LOT 20Q. SKYLINE PARK N0.2, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF. RECORDED IN BOOK 73-8 OF PLATS AT PAGE 66, RECORDS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
Witness the hand of said grantor this /5 day of June, 1999. 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the _/(_ day of June. 1999, personally appeared before me Dennis D. Linnell, the 
signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
n 
Mv Commission f:\uiros: 
NdTAkV PUBLIC" 
Otvfditt Stoffonoon 
t I M to. 700 &JfytU$ 
i ptMUkoCKy.Utth 04106 
MyCommtottonErtm 
Notary Public 









30-3-4.1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
lieve him from liability for the payment of nance judgment. Allred v. Allred, 12 Utah 2d 
support money under a prior separate mainte- 325, 366 P.2d 478 (1961). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R.3d 648. 
Separation §§ 274 et seq., 421. Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after 
C.J.S. — 27A C.J.S. Divorce §§ 143,230-233. remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153. 
AX.R. — Power of court to vacate decree of Necessity that divorce court value property 
divorce or separation upon request of both before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11. 
parties, 3 A.L.R.3d 1216. Authority of court, upon entenng default 
Power of court to award absolute divorce in judgment, to make orders for child custody or 
favor of party who desires only limited decree, support which were not specifically requested 
or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703. in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree 863. 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
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child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
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ADDENDUM C 
78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
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occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, i 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, 
ch. 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
(5Xb). 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, added ^ - h o u r " and the second sentence 
in Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Deductible expenses. 
Findings by court. 
Imputed income. 
Modification of award. 
Second job. 
Social Security benefits. 
Cited. 
Deductible expenses. 
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt 
with as a matter of law under this section; the 
deductibility of particular expenses poses a 
question of fact, turning on whether such ex-
penses are necessary, and, if so, whether they 
exceed those required for the business's opera-
tion at a reasonable level. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The trial court acted within its discretion in 
not deducting as "necessary expenses required 
for self-employment of business operation" the 
father's small business taxes and his student 
loan obligations in calculating his gross income. 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Findings by court. 
Although a trial court entered findings re-
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
failed to enter any findings required under 
Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole 
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 R2d 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
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